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A COMPARISON OF THE ROLE OF THE 
EMPLOYER IN THE FRENCH AND U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEMS 
Kathryn L. Moore 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is unique among developed nations in its heavy 
reliance on employment-based health insurance.
1
 The United States, 
however, is not the only nation in which employers play an important 
role in the financing of health care.  Indeed, long before employment-
based health insurance became common in the United States, countries 
with social insurance systems, such as France, Germany, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic, provided for the delivery of mandatory social 
insurance benefits, including health insurance, through the workplace.
2
 
This article explores the role of the employer in the health care 
system in one such country: France.  The French health care system 
merits study because in 2000 the World Health Organization ranked the 
system the best in the world based on its reputation for universal 
coverage, responsiveness to patient needs, and positive health outcomes, 
including longevity, infant mortality, and population health status.
3
 
 
 * Laramie L. Leatherman Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.  The 
author would like to thank Lucy Roberts for her helpful insights into the French health care system 
and James Donovan, Gordon Mowen, Ryan Valentin, and Eric Biscopink for their research 
assistance.   
 1.  PIERRE-LOUIS BRAS & DIDIER TABUTEAU, LES ASSURANCES MALADIE 19-20 (2010) 
(describing the American system as unique); Jacob S. Hacker, Review Article: Dismantling the 
Health Care State?  Political Institutions, Public Policies and the Comparative Policies of Health 
Reform, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 693, 697 (2004) (noting that the United States is the only advanced 
industrial state to rely principally on voluntary employment-based health insurance).   
 2.  SHERRY A. GLIED, The Employer-Based Health Insurance System: Mistake or 
Cornerstone, in POLICY CHALLENGES IN MODERN HEALTH CARE 37, 39 (David Mechanic et al. 
eds., 2005).   
 3.  World Health Organization [WHO], The World Health Report 2000 – Health Systems: 
Improving Performance, at 153 (2000).  But see Victor G. Rodwin, The Health Care System under 
French National Health Insurance: Lessons for health reform in the United States, in UNIVERSAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 59, 59 (2006) (noting that the methodology used in assessment has been criticized but that 
MOORE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2013  8:42 PM 
460 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:459 
This article begins by providing an overview of the French health 
care system.  It then discusses the role of the employer in the French 
health care system.  Finally, it compares the role of the employer in the 
French system with the role of the employer in the U.S. health care 
system. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The French health care system is a unique blend of public and 
private health insurance based on a compromise between two competing 
ideologies: egalitarianism and liberalism.
4
  Under the egalitarian ethos, 
all citizens are considered to be equal and thus entitled to equal access to 
health care.
5
  Liberalism, on the other hand, refers to the market-based 
economy
6
 and protects choice and competition in the provision of health 
care.
7
  French politicians claim that the French health care system is the 
ideal synthesis of “solidarity and liberalism,” lying between Britain’s 
“nationalized” system which rations health care too much and the 
American “competitive” system which leaves too many individuals 
uninsured.
8
 
The French health care system consists of two tiers:
9
 (1) mandatory 
 
French health care system is still impressive).   
 4.  DAVID G. GREEN & BENEDICT IRVINE, HEALTH CARE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY: 
LESSONS FOR THE UK 29 (Civitas 2001); see also Monika Steffen, The French Health Care System: 
Liberal Universalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 353, 356 (2010) (noting that “the French 
system combines and develops simultaneously what elsewhere would appear as contradictory, 
universalism and choice”). 
 5.  GREEN & IRVINE, supra note 4, at 29; see also Paul Clay Sorum, France Tries to Save its 
Ailing Health Insurance System, 26 J. OF PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 231, 241 (2005) (stating that “like 
most other developed countries, France remains committed, in the name of social solidarity, to the 
access of all its citizens (if not necessarily, in the Raffinin government, to all its residents) to the 
same basic health care”).   
 6.  Victor G. Rodwin, The Health Care System Under French National Health Insurance: 
Lessons for Health Reform in the United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 31 (2003) (noting that 
liberalism is “a term understood in much of Europe to mean market-based economic systems”).  
 7.  GREEN & IRVINE, supra note 4, at 29.   
 8.  Rodwin, supra note 6, at 31.  In 2010, the American health care system was 
fundamentally reformed with the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  
(Affordable Care Act).  Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Pub. L. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (2010).  Among other things, the Affordable Care Act was intended to address the 
problem of uninsurance in this country. Nancy-Ann DeParle, The Affordable Health Care Act Helps 
America’s Uninsured, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sep. 16, 2010, 2:33PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/16/affordable-care-act-helps-america-s-uninsured. 
Whether it will do so remains to be seen.   
 9.   See YUKATA IMAI ET AL., The Changing Health System in France, in UNIVERSAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE: HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 79, 81 (2006). 
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public health insurance, sometimes referred to as “statutory” health 
insurance,
10
 and (2) voluntary,
11
 mostly private, health insurance, 
sometimes referred to as “complementary” health insurance.12  Coverage 
under the first tier is universal.
13
  About 90 percent of the French 
population has second tier voluntary private health coverage.
14
 
A. First Tier – Mandatory Public Health Insurance 
The first tier mandatory public health insurance is provided through 
the country’s extensive social security system.15  Established in 1945,16 
the French social security system originally only covered workers and 
their families.
17
  In 1961, coverage was extended to farmers, and in 
 
 10.  See, e.g., ISABELLE DURAND-ZALESKI, The French Health Care System, 2012, in 
INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS (The Commonwealth Fund, 2012); Karine 
Chevreul et al., France: Health System Review, at 17 (Health Sys. in Transition, Vol. 12 No. 6, 
2010). 
 11.  Effective January 1, 2016, employment-based complementary health insurance will 
become mandatory.  See France Enacts the Labor Law Reform Act, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE 
(JORDAN), 2013 WLNR 16536778 (July 8, 2013) [hereinafter Labor Law Reform Act]. 
 12.  Some authorities distinguish between “complementary” and “supplementary” insurance, 
though not necessarily in an entirely uniform manner.  Compare Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 
69-70 (treating “complementary” insurance as insurance that “covers the discrepancy between 
[statutory health insurance] coverage and health care expenses” and treating “supplementary” 
insurance as insurance as covering services not covered by statutory health insurance) with World 
Health Organization Europe [WHO], What are the equity, efficiency, cost containment and choice 
implications of private health-care funding in western Europe? (July 2004) (stating that both 
“complementary” and “supplementary” private health insurance provide coverage for services 
excluded or not fully covered by statutory health insurance but that the main purpose of 
“supplementary” insurance is to “increase the choices of provider. . . and level of inpatient hotel 
amenities”); see also Sarah Thomson & Elias Mossialos, Private health insurance and access to 
health care in the European Union, EURO OBSERVER: NEWSLETTER OF THE EUROPEAN 
OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Spring 2004, at 2 (stating that complementary 
insurance covers “services excluded or not fully covered by the state,” while supplementary 
insurance “provides cover for faster access and increased consumer choice.”).  
 13.  See IMAI ET AL., supra note 9, at 81. 
 14.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 65. 
 15.  See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnes Couffinhaul, Private Health Insurance in France, 
8 (OECD Health, Working Paper No., 12, 2004).  The French Social Security system provides 
compulsory protection of (1) health (disease, maternity, incapacity, and death), (2) work-related 
illness and injuries, (3) family allowances, and (4) retirement (pension and widowhood).  Chevreul 
et al., supra note 10, at 20.   
 16.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 19.  France’s first statutory health insurance system was 
established in 1930.  This system was replaced by the Social Security system in 1945.  SIMONE 
SANDIER ET AL., Historical Background, Organizational Structure, and Management, in 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE: HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 129, 136 (2006). 
 17.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 20. 
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1966, coverage was further extended to the self-employed.
18
  Because 
coverage under the Social Security system was linked to employment 
status, gaps in coverage existed for certain low-income and unemployed 
individuals.
19
  In 2000, Couverture Maladie Universale (CMU) extended 
basic health insurance to all legal residents of France, regardless of 
employment status or prior contributions to the Social Security system.
20
  
The entire French population is now covered by the first tier mandatory 
public health insurance.
21
 
1. Structure of System 
Mandatory health insurance under the social security system is 
divided into three main regimes or schemes.
22
  The first regime or 
scheme is the general regime (régime général).
23
  It covers employees in 
commerce and industry and their families as well as individuals who 
receive CMU.
24
  The general regime is by far the most significant in 
terms of coverage; it covers more than 85% of the French population.
25
  
The second regime is the agricultural regime (mutualité sociale 
 
 18.  See id. at 20.  Coverage was extended to students in 1948 and career soldiers in 1949.  Id. 
at 54. 
 19.  Statutes were enacted in 1974 to extend coverage to individuals who were not otherwise 
covered by the social security system.  In order to receive coverage, individuals were required to 
contribute to the system, or request the department to contribute on their behalf if they had 
insufficient means.  As a practical matter, however, access to public insurance remained 
problematic for some groups.  Id. at 20. 
 20.  See Martine M. Bellanger et al., The “Health Benefit Basket” in France, 6 EUR. J. 
HEALTH ECON. S24, S24 (Supp. 1 2005).  CMU “changed the old system of individual insurance, 
with contributions that could be financed by the general councils according to income scales that 
varied from one department to another, to a system based on the logic of the right to social 
protection through insurance.  Since this reform, those whose income is below a certain level (2.3% 
of the population in 2006) are entitled to free public coverage.”  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 
21.   
 21.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 17, 54. 
 22.  Steffen, supra note 4, at 357. 
 23.  See Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24. 
 24.  See id.  
 25.  Not surprisingly, estimates of coverage vary.  For example, according to one authority, 
employees in commerce and industry and their families constitute about 84% of the French 
population while CMU was estimated to cover about 2.4% of the population in 2003.  See id, at 
S24.  According to another source, CMU extended coverage to 0.4% of the French population.  
DURAND-ZALESKI, supra note 10, at 39.  According to yet a third source, the general scheme 
“covers 56 million employees in commerce and industry and their families (87% of the population) 
and CMU beneficiaries (1.4 million people, 2.3% of the population in 2006).”  Chevreul et al., 
supra note 10, at 28.  See also Pierre Loiseau, When the Clouds Hung Oppressively Low in the 
Heavens: Unhealth Cost-Cutting in France and in the U.S., 70 LA. L. REV.  945, 946 (2010) (stating 
that the general regime covers 80% of the French population).   
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agricole).
26
  It covers farmers and agricultural workers and their 
families, which constitute about 7% of the French population.
27
  The 
third regime is the regime for the non-agricultural self-employed 
(CANAM).
28
  It covers the 5% or so of the population that is self-
employed, such as self-employed professionals like lawyers and 
craftsmen.
29
  The remainder of the French population is covered by ten 
or so other work-related schemes.
30
 
Each of the three major regimes consists of a national health 
insurance fund and local structures that correspond to the geographic 
distribution of their members.
31
  For example, the general regime has 
more than 100 local funds and 16 regional funds.
32
 
2. Management 
Each fund is a “self-governing unit, with a management board 
composed of an equal number of representatives of employer and trade 
unions,”33 as well as representatives of the mutual insurance associations 
and individuals appointed by the Minister of Health.
34
   
 
 26.  See Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24. 
 27.  See id.  Cf.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 28 (stating that the agricultural regime 
covers “3.6 million people or around 6% of the population”).   
 28.  Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24.   
 29.  See id.; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 28 (stating that the self-employed 
regime covers 3.4 million people or about 5% of the population). 
 30.  Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 28-29 
(noting that some of the smaller schemes are linked to the general regime while others have their 
organization and function independently; for historical reasons, individuals from the Alsace and 
Moselle regions have their own specific scheme with better coverage in return for higher 
contributions).   
 31.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 29. 
 32.   Again, specific estimates vary.  For example, according to one authority, the general 
regime has 16 regional funds and 105 local funds.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 29.  According 
to another authority, the general regime has 16 regional funds and 133 local funds. GREEN & 
IRVINE, supra note 4, at 30.  The regional funds’ responsibilities are limited to work-related 
accidents and illnesses.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 29.   
 33.  GREEN & IRVINE, supra note  4, at 30.  Agricultural workers, independent professions, 
civil servants, medical doctors, and students are covered by seventeen other funds.  Id.  Prior to 
1967, representatives of employees constituted a majority of the elected boards of director of the 
insurance funds.  In 1967, “elections to the board of directors were discontinued and replaced by a 
system of appointment by trade unions, with parity between employers and employees.”  SANDIER 
ET AL., supra note 16, at 139. 
 34.  SANDIER ET. AL., supra note 16, at 155.  For a more detailed discussion of the 
management of the health care funds, see infra Part II. 
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3. Coverage 
The mandatory health insurance covers medical goods and services 
such as hospital care, outpatient care, diagnostic services, 
pharmaceuticals, and health-care related transportation.
35
  In order to be 
eligible for coverage, the services or treatment must have been provided 
or prescribed by a doctor, dentist or midwife, and distributed by a health 
care professional or institution registered by the mandatory health 
insurance program.
36
 
Coverage varies depending on whether it is provided on an 
outpatient or inpatient basis.  Covered outpatient services are specifically 
identified in official lists displayed on the mandatory health insurance 
program’s web site.37  The lists are defined at the national level and 
apply throughout the country.
38
  Reimbursement for hospital care is 
provided on a diagnosis-related group (DRG) basis rather than on a 
procedure by procedure basis.
39
  Unless specified otherwise, hospital 
clinicians can decide what care to provide and what drugs to prescribe 
(so long as the drugs have market authorization).
40
 
Initially, mandatory health insurance was intended to provide 
curative care for illnesses and accidents, rather than preventive care.
41
  
Over the years, however, coverage has extended to include more and 
more preventive care.  For example, coverage is now provided for 
compulsory and recommended immunizations as well as 
mammograms.
42
 
Historically, the French health care system has been generous in 
terms of coverage,
43
 partly because the tendency had been to add items 
 
 35.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 55.   
 36.  See id; see also Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at S26 (“The reimbursement of goods and 
services depends on their inclusion in positive lists, according to Articles L.162-1-7, L.162-17, and 
L. 165-1 of the [Social Security Code].”).   
 37.   Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 55-56.  There are three official lists: (1) a list of 
covered procedures, (2) a list of reimbursable drugs, and (3) a list of reimbursable medical devices 
and health materials.  Id.  The Ministry of Health is responsible for identifying the covered drugs 
and medical devices while the National Union of Health Insurance Funds is responsible for the list 
of covered procedures.  Id. at 57.  The official website is found at www.amelia.fr.  See ISABELLE 
DURAND-ZALESKI & KARINE CHEVREUL, The French Health Care System, 2011, in 
INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, at 45 (The Commonwealth Fund, 2011). 
 38.   Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 57. 
 39.  See id., at 17; Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at S26. 
 40.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 56.   
 41.  See id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Steffen, supra note 4, at 363 (“From patients’ point of view, the French health system 
is indeed generous.  It offers universal access and high quality and affords each individual the 
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to the covered lists but never to delete them.
44
  In recent years, however, 
some services, and especially drugs with no proven efficacy, have been 
eliminated from the coverage list.
45
  In addition, there are a few 
categories of care where public health insurance benefits are quite 
limited, such as for eyeglasses, dental care, and non-dental prostheses.
46
 
Generally, individuals are expected to pay for the full cost of 
ambulatory care at the time services are provided and wait for 
reimbursement from their health insurance fund.
47
  Hospital care, in 
contrast, is generally paid for directly by the health funds.
48
 
4. Co-payments 
Although the mandatory insurance system is generally generous in 
terms of the services and drugs it covers, it typically does not cover 
100% of the costs.
49
  Although reimbursement rates varied with the 
particular scheme in the past, the reimbursement rates are now uniform 
across the schemes.
50
  The level of reimbursement depends on the 
category of care or service.
51
  For example, the mandatory health 
 
choice to consult general practitioners and specialists as well as to receive outpatient care at a public 
hospital or private clinic in often comparable financial conditions.”).   
 44.  See Chevreul et al, supra note 10, at 59; see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 363 (“[T]he 
rational interests of the actors involved – doctors, patients, unions, health industries, local 
politicians, and political parties – all converged to develop rather than to limit medical services and 
free access.  Only those responsible for public finances pursued and continue to pursue a restrictive 
policy.”).   
 45.  See Chevreul et al, supra note 10 at 59; see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 369 (discussing 
efforts to limit coverage under mandatory health insurance).   
 46.  See Buchmeuller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 10-11. 
 47.  See Chevreul et al, supra note 10, at 54.  There are, however, exceptions to the 
requirement that the patient make the initial direct payment.  For example, CMU beneficiaries are 
not required to make initial payments nor are individuals involved in occupational accidents and 
patients admitted to the hospital.  In addition, third party payments may be used in laboratories, 
pharmacies, hospital consultations and outpatient clinics and by some doctors for expensive 
examinations and treatments.  Id.   
 48.  See id. at 55. 
 49.  See id. at 59.  Full reimbursement in available in three instances: (1) individuals suffering 
from one of 30 specified long-term illnesses may be entitled to 100% reimbursement for treatment 
related to those diseases; (2) certain hospital and fertility treatments are fully reimbursed; and (3) 
full reimbursement is available for work accidents, pregnant women after the fifth month of 
pregnancy, and disabled children and pensioners.  Id. at 61; see also id. at 62 tbl 3.9 (listing 30 
illnesses eligible for 100% reimbursement); cf. Steffen, supra note 4, at 365 (stating that the 
“authorizing list has grown to thirty-one pathologies”).  For a comparison of cost sharing under the 
French, German, and Swiss health care systems, see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, COST SHARING 
FOR HEALTH CARE: FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SWITZERLAND (2009).   
 50.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 59. 
 51.  See id. at 59. 
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insurance system generally reimburses 80% of the cost of inpatient 
care,
52
 70% of the cost of doctor and dentist visits,
53
 60% of the cost of 
services provided by laboratories, and 65% of the cost of most drugs.
54
 
Co-payments (‘ticket modérateurs’),55 that is, the requirement that 
insureds pay for a portion of the cost of care, were instituted to moderate 
demand.
56
  Over the years, the patients’ share of costs has steadily 
increased.
57
  The ability of co-payments to rein in costs, however, has 
been limited because of the prevalence of the second tier voluntary 
complementary insurance, which generally covers most of the costs not 
covered by the mandatory insurance system.
58
 
In 2005, the government introduced additional flat co-payments.
59
  
 
 52.  The reimbursement rate increases to 100% after the 31st day of a hospital stay, for certain 
surgeries, and maternity care.  In addition, patients have to pay a flat-rate catering fee of €18 per day 
for hospital accommodations.  See id. at 60. 
 53.  Generally, costs for treatment procedures and tests that exceed €91 are fully covered.  Id.  
Since 2006, however, most patients have had to pay a flat rate of €18 for such treatment and 
procedures.  See id. at 63. 
 54.  See id. at 60 tbl 3.8.  Non-substitutable or expensive drugs are reimbursed at the rate of 
100% while drugs judged to have a low medical benefit are reimbursed at the rate of 15%.  See id. 
at 60.   
 55.  See Lisa Gentile, The Battle for Health in France: The Role of Ideas and Discourse in 
Constructing the Political Economy of Policy Reform (1990-2010), at 162 n. 212. (Sept. 2010) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (explaining the origin of the term ticket 
moderateur and its evolution in France). 
 56.  See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146; see also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra 
note 15, at 10 (“As the name suggests, the purpose of the ticket modérateur is to reduce the moral 
hazard associated with insurance coverage.”); cf. Steffen, supra note 4, at 360 (stating that the 
reason the first tier mandatory health insurance funds only provided partial reimbursement was 
because private and decentralized mutual benefit societies were widespread at the time the statutory 
system was introduced and the mutual benefit societies were the only institutions with the technical 
expertise to run a health insurance scheme); VICTOR G. RODWIN & SIMONE SANDIER, Health Care 
Under French National Health Insurance: A Public-Private Mix, Low Prices and High Volume, in 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN FRANCE HOW SUSTAINABLE? ESSAYS ON THE FRENCH HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM 169, 170 (2006) (“The attachment to la medicine libérale and to cost sharing rests on 
the principle of liberalism – the notion that there should be freedom of choice for physicians and 
patients and some direct responsibility for payment by patients.”).   
 57.  See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146 (“Over the years, the patient’s share of 
treatment costs has steadily increased by means of progressive increments, the introduction of a 
daily charge in hospitals and authorizations for Sector 2 doctors and for certain services, such as 
dentures and artificial limbs”); see also Jason J. Kilborn, Comparative Cause and Effect: Consumer 
Insolvency and the Eroding Social Safety Net, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 563, 587 (2008) (“[I]n 1993, 
the reimbursement level for medical services and drugs that were not fully reimbursable fell 5% 
(from 75% to 70% for medical services, 70% to 65% for major prescription drugs, and 40% to 35% 
for drugs for non-serious conditions)”). 
 58.  See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 
10-11; Gentile, supra note 55, at 162-63.  
 59.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 63 (describing additional flat co-payments and 
stating that they were introduced to raise additional revenue). 
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Under these additional co-payments, individuals must pay €1 for every 
doctor visit and test up to €4 per day and €50 per year, and €2 for each 
medical transport by ambulance or medical taxi, and €0.50 for each 
drug, up to a second ceiling of €50.60  These additional co-payments may 
be more effective in moderating demand than the ticket moderateurs 
because voluntary health insurance is prohibited from picking up these 
additional co-payments.
61
 
In addition, a gatekeeping element was introduced to moderate 
demand.
62
  Historically, no individual or entity served as a gatekeeper in 
the French health care system.
63
  Rather, individuals had the freedom to 
choose their doctors and other medical care providers. 
64
  Under the new 
gatekeeping element, visits to a registered gatekeeping general 
practitioner (GP) and/or specialist recommended by a gatekeeping GP 
are reimbursed at the rate of 70% while visits outside of the gatekeeping 
system may only be reimbursed at the rate of 50%.
65
  Voluntary health 
insurance is prohibited from reimbursing the rate differential.
66
   
5. Financing 
Traditionally, mandatory health insurance was financed almost 
exclusively by “social contributions” (cotisations socials) imposed on 
both employers and employees.
67
  The social contributions, like the 
payroll taxes used to fund the U.S. Social Security system,
68
 are based 
 
 60.  See id.  
 61.  See supra Part 2.A.5. 
 62.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71.   
 63.  See Jean-Pierre Poullier & Simone Sandier, Reconsidering the Role of Competition in 
Health Care Markets, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 899, 899 (2000); see also RODWIN & 
SANDIER, supra note 56, at 176.  Recently, however, the system introduced a gatekeeping element 
under which visits to a gatekeeping general practitioner (GP) are reimbursed at the rate of 70% 
while visits to other GPs may only be reimbursed at the rate of 50%, and voluntary health insurance 
is prohibited from reimbursing the rate differential.  DURAND-ZALESKI & CHEVREUL, supra note 
37, at 47; see also Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at S27 (discussing new gatekeeping rules); 
Steffen, supra note 4, at 368-69.   
 64.  Poullier & Sandier, supra note 63, at 899; RODWIN & SANDIER, supra note 56, at 176.  
Indeed, French doctors have insisted on the system retaining the principles of independent medical 
practice, specifically, free choice of doctor, freedom to prescribe, professional confidentiality, and 
direct payment of fees by patients.  SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 142.   
 65.  DURAND-ZELESKI & CHEVREUL, supra note 37, at 47; Bellanger, et al., supra note 20, at 
S27; Steffen, supra note 4, at 368-69.   
 66.  See supra Part 2.A.5. 
 67.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 20; Steffen, supra note 4, at 357; BRUNO PALIER, 
GOUVERNER LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 81 (2005).   
 68.  26 U.S.C.  §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2012).   
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on a percentage of compensation.
69
  As the cost of health care increased, 
so too did the social contribution rate.
70
  By 1992, the social contribution 
rate had reached a combined rate of 19.6% of gross wages, with 
employers contributing 12.8% and employees contributing 6.8%.
71
 
Mandatory health insurance continues to be funded in large part by 
employer wage-based social contributions.
72
  In 2013, the employer 
contribution rate is 13.1%,
73
 and employer contributions account for 
about 47% of the mandatory health insurance system’s revenues.74  For 
the most part, the employee wage-based social contribution, which has 
fallen from 6.8% in 1992 to 0.75% of gross earnings in 2013,
75
 has been 
replaced by an earmarked tax, the general social contribution 
(contribution sociale géneralisée or CSG).
76
  The CSG is based on total 
income, with the rate depending on the source of income.
77
  It is 
 
 69.  When the system was originally enacted, there was a cap on the wages against which 
health insurance contributions would be levied.  PALIER, supra note 67, at 81.  The cap was 
gradually eliminated between 1967 and 1984.  Rémi Pellet, L’évolution du financement de 
l’assurance maladie: Bilan et perspectives [Financing French Health Insurance: Evolution and 
Perspectives] 76 Revue d’Économie Financière 87, 92 (2004); Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 66. 
But cf. Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform: Fundamental Restructuring or Incremental 
Change?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 341, 355 (2007) [hereinafter Social Security Reform] 
(discussing maximum taxable wage base under U.S. Social Security system).  
 70.  See Steffen, supra note 4, at 363-66. 
 71.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 66; PAUL V. DUTTON, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES: A 
COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
FRANCE 201 (2007).  But cf. RODWIN & SANDIER, supra note 56, at 177 & n. 25 (stating that since 
1992, employers pay 12.8% of the wage bill and employees pay 6.9% of their full salary, bringing 
the total payroll tax for health insurance to 19.7% of all wages.”).   
 72.  “Although there seems to be a consensus on the need for a reform to employers’ 
contributions, the experts remain cautious because of the economic and technical problems of 
alternatives, whether in the form of a ‘social value-added tax’ (VAT) or generalized fiscalization.”  
Steffen, supra note 4, at 366.   
 73.  Taux en vigueur pour les salaries versés  à partir du 1er janvier 2013, (stating that 
effective January 1, 2013, the employer social contribution is levied at the rate of 13.1%), available 
at http://www.lexisnexis.fr/services_gratuits/indices_taux/charges_sociales_salaires.html.  Lower 
rates and even exemptions may be available for unskilled or low cost jobs and for handicapped 
employees.  See also Steffen, supra note 4, at 357; Gérard Cornilleau and Thierry Debrand, Crise et 
deficit de l’assurance maladie: Faut-il changer de paradigme?, La Revue de L’OFCE 315, 325 
(Janvier 2011).   
 74.  See Steffen, supra note 4, at 357.   
 75.  Taux en vigueur pour les salaries versés  à partir du 1er janvier 2013, (stating that 
effective January 1, 2013, the employee social contribution is levied at the rate of 0.75%), available 
at http://www.lexisnexis.fr/services_gratuits/indices_taux/charges_sociales_salaires.html.   
 76.  Id. at 66.  The CSG was introduced in 1991,and the rate and base have progressively 
expanded.  Steffen, supra note 4, at 366.  The CSG was intended to (1) be employment-friendly, 
reducing the burden of employment-based taxes; (2) reinforce social equity by expanding the tax 
base, and (3) raise revenue to reduce the social security deficit.  Gentile, supra note 55, at 152. 
 77.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 66. 
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generally 7.5% on earned income,
78
 8.2% on capital,
79
 9.5% on 
gambling winnings, 6.6% on pensions, and 6.2% on benefits.
80
  
Employees’ income-related contributions constitute about 37% of the 
systems’ revenues. 81  The remaining 16% of the systems’ revenues 
come from a variety of other sources such as taxes on tobacco, alcohol, 
and pharmaceutical companies.
82
 
B. Second Tier—Voluntary Health Insurance 
Mandatory basic health insurance covers about three-quarters of 
health expenditures in France.
83
  Remaining costs are covered by 
voluntary health insurance and individual patients.
84
 
First instituted in the mid-19
th
 Century, voluntary health insurance 
predates the first tier mandatory health insurance system.
85
  By the start 
of World War II, mutuelles provided voluntary health insurance 
coverage to about two-thirds of the French population.
86
  Today, about 
88% of the French population has voluntary private health insurance, 
and another 7% of the population has voluntary health insurance through 
the public Couverture Maladie Universelle Complémentaire (CMU-C) 
program.
87
  Effective January 1, 2016, complementary employment-
 
 78.  5.1% goes toward mandatory health insurance.  Id. at 66-67.  The CSG rate on earned 
income is reduced to 3.8% of earned income for low-income individuals who are exempt from 
income tax, which is about half of French households.  Id. at 67.   
 79.  5.95% goes toward mandatory health insurance.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Steffen, supra note 4, at 357. 
 82.  Id.  For a breakdown of the other taxes and their relative contribution to revenues, see 
Chevreul et al., supra note 37, at 67-68 & tbl. 3.12; see also DURAND-ZALESKI & CHEVREUL, supra 
note 10, at 47 (identifying sources of revenue and their relative contributions)  .   
 83.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 43; Bellanger et al., supra note 20, at S24.  
 84.  France is ranked third among OECD countries in the share of health care financed by 
private health insurance.  Only the U.S. and the Netherlands have a higher share of health care costs 
financed by private insurance.  Buchmeueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 7.  In 2007, the 
national health insurance funds covered 76.6%  of personal health expenditures, state and local 
authorities covered 1.4%, mutual benefit funds 7.9%, insurance companies 3.2%, employer-
sponsored health benefit schemes 2.5%, and households 8.4%.  Steffen, supra note 4, at 365 tbl. 1.  
Cf  Chevreul, et al., supra note 10, at 65 (complementary insurance “covers about 13.4% of total 
health expenditures (7.7% by mutual insurance associations, 3.3% by private insurance companies, 
and 2.5% by provident institutions)” and private households pay about 6.8%).   
 85.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 20 (discussing the mutual benefit movement which 
started in the 19th century and whose membership had grown to nearly 10 million members by 
1940).   
 86.  See Buchmueller and Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8. 
 87.  See Chevreul et al, supra note 10, at 71, 73 (stating that by 2006, 88% of the French 
population had private voluntary health insurance and 7% of the French population had CMU-C so 
that 95% of the French population had complementary health insurance).  Cf. Steffen, supra note 4, 
MOORE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2013  8:42 PM 
470 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:459 
based health insurance will become mandatory under the “Law for the 
security of employment” (“Loi de Sécuritisation del’Emploi”) enacted 
on June 14, 2013.
88
 
1. Types of Voluntary Private Health Insurance 
Commentators and policymakers often divide voluntary private 
health insurance into three different types: (1) substitutive, (2) 
complementary, and (3) supplementary.
89
  As its name suggests, 
substitutive health insurance substitutes or replaces first tier mandatory 
health insurance.
90
  It provides coverage for individuals who are 
excluded from the first tier mandatory health insurance program.
91
  
Complementary insurance provides coverage for services excluded or 
not fully covered by first tier mandatory health insurance.
92
  For 
example, it may pick up the cost of co-payments or cover services, such 
as dental services, that are excluded from the first tier.  Finally, like 
complementary insurance, supplementary insurance may cover services 
that are excluded or not fully covered by first tier mandatory health 
insurance.
93
  Its principal purpose, however, is to increase the choice of 
providers and thus provide insureds with faster access to care.
94
  It may 
also provide insureds with a higher level of inpatient hotel amenities, 
such as private rooms.
95
 
In France, voluntary private health insurance is “complementary.”96  
For the most part, it simply covers co-payments for services covered by 
the first tier public health insurance;
97
 although recently private health 
 
at 358 (stating that about 93% of the French population and 96% of French employees have 
voluntary complementary insurance).   
 88.  Labor Law Reform Act, supra note 11. 
 89.  See, e.g., Sarah Thomson & Elias Mossialos, Private health insurance and the internal 
market, in HEALTH SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND 
POLICY 419, 421-23 (Mossialos et al. eds., 2010).  Not all commentators use the terms in an 
identical fashion, however. See supra note 12.  
 90.  See, e.g., Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 422-23. 
 91.  See id.  
 92.  See id. at 422. 
 93.  What are the equity, efficiency, cost containment and choice implications of private 
health-care funding in Western Europe?, supra note 12, at 9.   
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See id.   
 96.  See Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8 (“Private health insurance serves a 
complementary function in the French system, reimbursing patients for cost-sharing required by the 
public system and for medical goods and services for which public reimbursement levels fall below 
market-determined prices.”). 
 97.   DURAND-ZALESKI,  supra note 10, at 40; see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 362 
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insurance providers have extended coverage to services and amenities 
that are not covered by the basic health insurance system.
98
  Unlike in 
other countries, private health insurance in France is not 
“supplementary;” that is, it “is not used to jump public sector queues or 
to obtain access to elite providers.”99 
Voluntary private health insurance may be purchased by individuals 
or through group contracts.
100
  About half of voluntary private health 
insurance contracts are purchased through the group insurance market by 
employers providing job-related benefits.
101
 
2. Public Provision of Voluntary Health Insurance 
When CMU extended first tier public health insurance to all legal 
residents of France in 2000, it also introduced CMU-C, free public 
complementary health insurance for low-income individuals.
102
  CMU-C 
 
(according to a 2007 study by the Ministry of Health, two-thirds of mutual benefit societies’ 
“contracts provide full reimbursement for those medical services partially reimbursed by national 
health insurance, without offering any services that are not at all covered by the latter”). 
 98.  DURAND-ZALESKI & CHEVREUL,  supra note 37, at 48; see also Chevreul et al., supra 
note 10, at 70 (“With the wide development of a market that is almost saturated, a few VHI 
providers recently extended complementary coverage.  These providers may compete on offering 
contracts that cover goods and services not covered by SHI, such as omega-3 fatty acids and surgery 
for short-sight.”).   
 99.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 69.  
 100.  See id. at 71. 
 101.  See IMAI ET AL., supra note 9, at 126, n.3; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 
14. See also Kilborn, supra note 57, at 572 (noting that in about 57% of cases, voluntary health 
insurance is paid for by employers); Dominique Polton, Recent reforms affecting private health 
insurance in France, EURO OBSERVER: NEWSLETTER OF THE EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON 
HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, Spring 2004, at 4 (stating that “[m]ore than 50% of VHI policies 
are purchased through employers, who often pay a part of the premium as a fringe benefit”); 
Francesca Columbo & Nicole Tapay, Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries: The Benefits 
and Costs for Individuals and Health Systems 18, (OECD Health Working Papers No. 15, 2004) 
(stating that about 50% of VHI is employment-based).  Cf. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71 
(noting that according to a 2006 general population survey, 40% of privately insured individuals are 
covered by a company group contract and that 85% of group contracts are sponsored by employers 
who pay, on average, 60% of the premium); Michel Grignon & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, Income 
and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in France 8, (Institut de Recherche et 
Documentation en Économie de la Santé, Working Paper No. 24, 2009) (stating that according to 
self-reports, 39% of contracts are purchased through an employer, 2% through a pool for the self-
employed, 39% are obtained through the non-group market and 15% are by retirees maintaining 
coverage they had through their previous occupation); GLIED, supra note 2, at 40 (noting that “[i]n 
France, supplemental job-based coverage accounts for about two-thirds of voluntary private health 
insurance”).   
 102.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 72-73; see also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra 
note 15, at 7 (“This [CMU-C] coverage expansion addressed equity concerns relating to the fact that 
lower income patients, who were less likely to have private complementary insurance or who held 
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is available free of charge to individuals with an annual income below a 
ceiling, equal to €7521 in January 2010.103  CMU-C is financed 
principally by a tax on voluntary health insurance contract premiums,
104
 
and covered 7% of the French population in 2008.
105
  CMU-C 
reimburses eligible individuals for tickets modérateurs, the co-payments 
required under the first tier health insurance system,
106
 and prohibits 
doctors from charging CMU patients more than the statutorily agreed 
rates.
107
  Prices that providers can charge CMU-C patients for eyeglasses 
and dental prostheses are capped, and CMU-C pays the share of covered 
patients’ costs that are not covered by the first tier health care system.108  
CMU-C beneficiaries may choose to receive their complementary 
coverage through the statutory system or through a private health 
insurer.
109
 
In order to assist low-income individuals who do not qualify for 
CMU-C coverage, a voucher system was created in 2004 to help 
individuals with incomes below a ceiling equal to 120% of the CMU 
ceiling to purchase voluntary health insurance.
110
  The assistance 
increases with an individual’s age ranging from €100 for individuals 
under age twenty-five to €400 for individuals over sixty in 2010.111  In 
2008, only 380,000 out of 2.2 million eligible individuals used the 
voucher system.
112
 
 
contracts with limited benefits, tended to face higher out-of-pocket costs than higher income 
individuals, who had more complete private coverage.”); Michel Grignon et al., Does Free 
Complementary Health Insurance Help the Poor to Access Health Care?  Evidence from France, 17 
HEALTH ECON. 203, 205 (2008) (noting that the French government introduced CMU-C “to help the 
non-elderly poor access health care”).   
 103.  See id. at 72-73. The income ceiling varies with the household size.  It ranges from €7521 
for individuals to €3760 per person for a household of six and €3008 for each additional household 
member.  Id. at 73, n.8.   
 104.  Id. at 73. 
 105.  Id.  See also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 15 (“A survey conducted in 
2000 showed that CMU beneficiaries were younger, more frequently female and members of single 
parent households than the general population.  Compared with the target population, beneficiaries 
are also more often unemployed or out of the labour force.”).   
 106.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 13.  
 107.   See id.   
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Id. at 23 (noting that by December 2002, 15% of individuals were covered by a private 
plan).   
 110.   Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 73.   
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id; see also Michel Grignon & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, supra note 101, at 7 (noting 
that only between 10 and 20% of the target population has taken advantage of the voucher system 
and investigating the reasons for the low up-take). 
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3. Benefits 
Unlike mandatory health insurance benefits, voluntary health 
insurance benefits are not uniform.
113
  Most voluntary health insurance 
fully reimburses patients for the cost of covered drugs, other than those 
considered to be “of low medical benefit,” and for the cost of procedures 
and tests up to the statutorily agreed rate.
114
  About 25% of doctors work 
in “Sector 2” and are permitted to charge fees that exceed the statutorily 
agreed rates.
115
  Voluntary contracts differ on the amount that they will 
reimburse with respect to charges that exceed the statutorily agreed rate, 
often referred to “balance-billing.”116  In addition, voluntary contracts 
differ with respect to reimbursement rates for low-benefit drugs, medical 
devices, private amenities, and services not covered by the first tier 
health insurance regime.
117
  Group contracts tend to provide better 
coverage than do individual contracts,
118
 and higher paid individuals 
tend to have better and more complete coverage than do lower paid 
workers.
119
 
Recently, the French government introduced some degree of 
uniformity in the voluntary private health insurance market by providing 
financial incentives to voluntary health insurance providers that enter 
into “responsible contracts” (contrats responsible).120  In order to qualify 
 
 113.  For a discussion of the various types health insurance offered to employees, see Camille 
Francesconi et al., Company supplementary health insurance: Compulsory or voluntary schemes, 
avoiding adverse selection and its effect on employees, QUESTIONS D’ÉCONOMIE DE LA SANTÉ, Nov. 
2006, No. 115. 
 114.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 70.  Nearly all private health insurance contracts 
also pay the per diem co-payment for in patient hospital stays.  There is, however, considerable 
variation in coverage for the cost of private rooms.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 
10.   
 115.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 97-98.  The proportion of “Sector 2” doctors varies 
by speciality.  Only 8% of general practitioners are Sector 2 doctors while 75% of surgeons work in 
“Sector 2.”  Id; see also Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 10 (“Roughly one quarter of 
French physicians have the right to charge more than the conventional tariff; about 11% of GP visits 
and 33% of specialist visits lead to balance billing.”).   
 116.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 70; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 11. 
 117.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 70; Grignon & Kambia-Chopin, supra note 101, at 
6. 
 118.   See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71. 
 119.  See RODWIN & SANDIER, supra note 56, at 193, n.26; Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 
89, at 3; Buchmueller & Couffinal, supra note 15, at 13; see also Kilborn, supra note 57, at 572 (“In 
2000, coverage rates ranged from 72% of unskilled workers to 85% of office employees to 94% of 
teachers, administrators, and other intermediate and managerial ‘white collar’ workers . . . . In 2000, 
the rate of those either uninsured or underinsured ranged from just under 40% of those earning 
$1500 or more per month to over 70% of those earning less than $750 per month.”). 
 120.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 71.  Premiums from responsible contracts are exempt 
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as a responsible contract, voluntary health insurance must not cover the 
mandatory health insurance co-payments that were introduced in 2005 
(€1 for every doctor visit and test up to €4 per day and €50 per year and 
€2 for medical transport and €0.50 for each drug, up to a second €50 
ceiling) or the additional co-insurance and co-payment fees imposed 
when patients do not use the new registered gatekeeping physician 
process.
121
  On the other hand, if patients do use the new registered 
gatekeeping physician process, responsible contracts must cover 100% 
of physician fees, at least 95% of the costs of important drugs covered at 
the 65% level by mandatory health insurance, and at least 95% of the 
cost of laboratory tests covered by mandatory health insurance. 
122
  In 
addition, responsible contracts must cover at least two important types of 
preventive services from a defined list.
123
  By 2006, almost all voluntary 
health insurance contracts were “responsible contracts.”124 
4. Types of Providers 
Three types of organizations offer voluntary health insurance in 
France: (1) non-profit mutuelles which account for almost 60% of the 
market, (2) non-profit provident institutions which account for 15 to 
20% of the market, and (3) commercial for-profit insurance companies 
which account for about 20% of the market.
125
 
i. Mutuelles 
Mutuelles, which date to the mid-19
th
 Century, played a key role in 
insuring the French population prior to the enactment of the French 
Social Security system.
126
  Although mutuelles were not chosen to 
manage the first tier mandatory health care system, they played – and 
 
from a 7% tax that would otherwise apply. Id., at 70.  “Solidarity contracts” (contrats solidaires) are 
also exempt from this 7% tax. Solidarity contracts are contracts that do not require a health 
questionnaire or base premiums on pre-existing health conditions.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 71.   
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 17.  Generally, the elderly are more likely 
to be covered by mutuelles, farmer households are more likely to be covered by commercial 
insurance companies, and executives are more likely to be covered by provident institutions.  See 
Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 76. 
 126.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8.  “In 1900 there were roughly 13,000 
mutuelles covering over 2 million people and by the start of World War II, two-thirds of the 
population had coverage for illness.”  Id. 
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continue to play – an important role in the development of voluntary 
private health insurance in France.
127
 
Mutuelles are non-profit organizations that emphasize mutual aid 
and solidarity.
128
  They generally offer open enrollment, lifetime 
coverage,
129
 and use community-rated premiums or base premiums on a 
percentage of income rather than using risk-rating or risk selection 
strategies.
130
  Complementary health insurance is the principal focus of 
business for most mutuelles, and they are financed almost entirely by 
subscriber fees and payments.
131
 
Mutuelles may be organized along occupational lines or geographic 
lines.
132
  For example, mutuelles may cover particular “groups of public 
sector employees such as teachers,” while others cover individuals who 
live in a particular geographic area.
133
  Enrollment is fairly evenly 
divided between individual and group contracts.
134
 
ii. Provident Institutions 
Provident institutions were initially created to provide retirement 
and other social insurance benefits to employees.
135
  About fifty-one 
such institutions offer complementary health insurance, which accounted 
 
 127.  Id. (“That history and the fact that the mutuelles have continued to play an important role, 
not only as market participants, but in influencing the public policy environment, are important 
factors that explain the high rate of private insurance coverage in France today.”).   
 128.  Id. at 18. 
 129.  Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 454.   
 130.  Id.; Buchmueller &  Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 18; Cf. Chevreul et al., supra note 10, 
at 75 (stating that mutual insurance companies “avoid, as much as permitted by competition, 
differentiation in premiums for a given level of coverage.  For this reason, they make limited use of 
risk rating. Moreover, some mutual companies also adjust their premium according to income.”)  
The Code de la Mutualité limits the factors that can be taken into account in determining premiums 
to the following: “[I]ncome, the time span since the initial subscription of a contract, the health 
insurance fund that the subscriber is a member of, the location, the number of beneficiaries, and 
their age.”  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 20.  
 131.  In 2000, 95% of mutuelles’ outlays were for complementary health insurance.  “Other 
activities include the provision of other types of social insurance such as disability and life 
insurance.  Some mutuelles also operate different types of facilities including pharmacies, optical 
care clinics and retirement homes.”  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 18 & n. 21. 
 132.  Id. at 18.  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75 (“[Provident institutions] were created at 
the end of the Second World War to manage the supplementary retiree pensions for senior 
executives and intellectual professionals . . . . They progressively enlarged their activity to the 
coverage of ‘heavy risk’ and finally offered [voluntary health insurance].”). 
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for about half of the industry’s revenues in 2002.136  Provident 
institutions principally offer group contracts,
137
 and individual 
organizations tend to focus on particular industries or professional 
groups.
138
 
iii. Commercial Insurance Companies 
Unlike mutuelles and provident institutions, commercial insurance 
companies operate for profit, and complementary health insurance is 
only a small portion of the industry’s business.139  Unlike mutuelles, 
commercial insurance companies use risk-rating strategies (such as 
taking health status into account) to rate premiums.
140
  Commercial 
insurance contracts are more or less evenly divided between individual 
and group contracts.
141
 
iv. Regulation of Providers 
Mutuelles are regulated by the mutual insurance code (code de la 
mutualité) while provident institutions are regulated principally by the 
Social Security code (code de la sécurité sociale)
142
 and commercial 
insurance companies are regulated by the commercial insurance code.
143
  
Traditionally, the most significant difference in the regulatory regimes 
related to tax treatment;
144
 specifically, mutuelles and provident 
institutions were exempt from the health insurance premium tax.
145
  In 
 
 136.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 18-19.  
 137.  Id. at 19; see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75 (“[Provident institutions] 
specialize in providing group contracts for companies that have a policy of mandatory enrolment in 
[voluntary health insurance] for their employees.”). 
 138.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19 (stating that mandatory contracts account 
for half of provident institutions’ activity). 
 139.  See id. at 19. (“In the life and health insurance industry, complementary health insurance 
represents less than 5% of total revenue.”).  
 140.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75.  Unlike the traditional practice of mutuelles, 
commercial insurance carriers, which entered the market in force in the 1980s, “practiced risk-based 
pricing, varying premiums with age and according to the results of medical questionnaires.  
Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 21.  
 141.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75 (stating that sixty percent of business is in individual 
contracts and forty percent is in group contracts); Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19 
(“Group and individual contracts account for comparable numbers of contracts.”).   
 142.  Individual contracts offered by provident institutions are regulated by the commercial 
insurance code.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75.   
 143.  Id.   
 144.  Buchmueller & Couffinal, supra note 15, at 19.   
 145.  Id.; Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 453. 
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addition, mutuelles were traditionally subjected to less rigorous solvency 
rules.
146
 
Both the differential tax treatment and less rigorous solvency rules 
were found to violate the European Union’s Third Non-life Directive 
regulating private health insurance and requiring equal treatment of all 
insurers.
147
  In response, the French government tightened up the 
solvency rules applicable to mutuelles
148
 and replaced the tax exemption 
for mutuelles and provident institutions with a tax exemption for 
“solidarity” and “responsible” contracts.149  “Solidarity” contracts are 
contracts that do not require a health questionnaire or base premiums on 
pre-existing health conditions.
150
  “Responsible” contracts are contracts 
that, among other things, do not provide reimbursement for the 
mandatory co-payment fees and gatekeeping differentials introduced in 
2005.
151
  Any provider, including a commercial insurance company that 
offers a “solidarity” or “responsible” contract is now exempt from the 
insurance premium tax.
152
 
III. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER IN THE FRENCH HEALTH INSURANCE 
SYSTEM 
The employer plays an important role in the French health 
insurance system in three ways.  First, employer contributions account 
for a little less than fifty percent of the funding of the first tier mandatory 
health care system.
153
  Second, employers help administer the first tier 
health funds.
154
  Finally, about half of second tier voluntary private 
health insurance is purchased in the group market through employers as 
job-related benefits.
155
 
 
 146. Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 450. 
 147.  See id. at 450, 453. 
 148.  Id. at 451; see Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 20. 
 149.  Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 453-54. In 2007, the European Commission 
launched a formal investigation into the “solidarity” and “responsible” contract. Id. at 454. 
 150.  See id. at 454; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19. This requirement 
automatically applies to mutuelles and It is thought that most contracts now satisfy these 
requirements. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 19-20.  
 151.   See supra Part II.B.3.   
 152.  See Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 455. 
 153.  See Steffen, supra note 4, at 357. 
 154.  See Sorum, supra note 5, at 232.  
 155.  See Kilborn, supra note 57, at 572.  
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A. Funding of Mandatory Health Insurance 
At the time the French Social Security system was originally 
enacted, there were two basic approaches to social protection: the British 
“Beveridgean” model and the German “Bismarckian” model.156  Under 
the Beveridgean model, the main policy objective is the prevention of 
poverty. 
157
  Under the Bismarckian system,
158
 the main policy objective 
is income maintenance for employees.
159
  In structuring their Social 
Security system, the French deliberately elected to adopt a Bismarckian 
system rather than a Beveridgean model.
160
 
Consistent with the Bismarckian model, the French elected to fund 
their Social Security system, including health care benefits, exclusively 
with wage-based social contributions imposed on both employers and 
employees.
161
  There were two reasons underlying the decision to fund 
benefits exclusively with social contributions.  First, the French feared 
that social policy might take a backseat to financial considerations if 
Social Security were funded by general taxes.
162
  Second, and more 
importantly, the French believed in the social insurance model,
163
 which 
requires that the individuals benefitting from the plan be the ones paying 
 
 156.  See Giuliano Bonoli & Bruno Palier, Reclaiming Welfare: The Politics of French Social 
Protection Reform, in SOUTHERN EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES 240, 242 (Martin Rhodes ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter Reclaiming Welfare].  
 157.  Id. at 242 (“[I]n France, a Beveridgean system is seen as one in which benefits are 
directed at the whole population, are typically flat-rate and are financed through taxation.”).  
 158.  The Bismarckian model is sometimes referred to as a “corporatist conservative” regime 
or “occupational welfare state.” See id. at 243.  
 159.  Id. at 242. (“[A] Bismarckian welfare state is one which typically grants earnings-related 
benefits, where entitlement is conditional upon a contribution record and financing is provided by 
employers’ and employees’ contributions.”).   
 160.  PALIER, supra note 67, at 81; Sorum, supra note 5, at 232; see Gentile, supra note 55, at 
135 & n.167 (discussing universalist aspirations of French social security system but noting that 
system’s goal was security and income maintenance, not redistribution).  
 161.  See supra Part II.A.6. 
 162.  PALIER, supra note 67, at 81. A similar concern has been raised in debates regarding the 
funding of the U.S. Social Security system.  See Social Security Reform, supra note 69, at 359-60 
(“[C]ritics of general revenue financing fear . . . that [it] might erode public support for the program 
by drawing it more explicitly into annual budget debates.”). 
 163.  See Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 246 (“The use of funds collected through 
taxation in order to finance the social insurance system is not seen as legitimate.  Conversely, 
money collected through contributions cannot be used to finance assistance (or solidarité nationale) 
that is, to benefit people who have not contributed to the social insurance system.”); see also 
Lawrence H. Thompson & Melinda M. Upp, The Social Insurance Approach and Social Security, in 
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 6-7 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds., 1997) 
(identifying “contributory financing” as one of seven characteristics typically included in social 
insurance).   
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for it.
164
 
Over the years, a number of Beveridgean elements have been 
incorporated into the French mandatory health insurance system.
165
  For 
example, in 2000, CMU extended basic health insurance to all legal 
residents of France, regardless of employment status or prior 
contributions to Social Security.
166
  As the mandatory health care system 
has incorporated Beveridgean elements, funding has shifted from a 
purely contributory system to a system partially funded by general 
taxes.
167
  For example, the employee share of wage-based social 
contribution funding
168
 has been largely replaced with a general social 
contribution that is levied on total income, not just wages.
169
 
Wage-based social contributions, however, have not been entirely 
eliminated.
170
  Employers remain subject to a 13.1% wage-based social 
contribution, which accounts for about 47% of the mandatory health 
insurance system’s revenues.171 
 
 164.   PALIER, supra note 67, at 81. 
 165.  Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 243 (recognizing the incorporation into the 
French system of a non-contributory, Beveridgean element into their system to provide for 
individuals who do not have access to insurance benefits); Sorum, supra  note 5, at 234 (“Like other 
developed countries, however, France had evolved its own particular blend of Bismarck and 
Beveridge, of public and private, and of centralization and decentralization.”). See generally Bruno 
Palier & Guiliano Bonoli, Entre Bismarck et Beveridge: <<Crises>> de la sécurité sociale et 
polique(s), 45 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 668 (1995) (Fr.) [hereinafter Entre 
Bismarck et Beveridge] (providing a detailed discussion of the mix of Bismarckian and Beveridgean 
elements in the French social security system).  
 166.  See Sorum, supra note 5, at 234. 
 167.  Cf. Giuliano Bonoli and Bruno Palier, Changing the Politics of Social Programmes: 
Innovative Change in British and French Welfare Reforms, 8 J. OF EUR. SOC. POL’Y 317, 327 
(1998) [hereinafter Changing the Politics] (“What these measures have in common is that they 
contribute to change the original Bismarckian nature of the French social security system, and move 
towards a state-run, tax-financed system, at least in the area of health care and family benefits.”). 
 168.  The employee share of wage-based social contributions has fallen from 6.8% of gross 
earnings in 1994 to .75% of gross earnings in 2013.  See DUTTON, supra note 71, at 201 (stating that 
employee share of social contributions was 6.8% in 1994; Charges socials sur salaries: Taux en 
vigueur pour les salaries versés  à partir du 1er janvier, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://www.lexisnexis.fr/services_gratuits/indices_taux/charges_sociales_salaires.html (last visited 
April 24, 2013) (stating that effective on January 1, 2013, the employee social contribution is levied 
at the rate of .75%).  
 169.  See supra Part 2.A.6.  In addition, a small portion of the mandatory health insurance 
system is funded by taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and pharmaceutical companies.  
 170.  See supra Part 2.A.6. 
 171.  See supra Part 2.A.6.  There has, however, been debate about alternative forms of 
employer financing.  See Pellet, supra note 69, at 121-27.  
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B. Administration of Mandatory Health Insurance Funds 
In a traditional Bismarckian system, employer and employee 
representatives coadminister the health insurance funds and are fully 
responsible for the system’s management and financial stability.172  
Thus, when the French mandatory health insurance system was 
originally created, it, like any traditional Bismarckian system, was to be 
independent of the state and jointly administered by employer and 
employee representatives.
173
  The decision to confer management 
authority to employee and employer representatives (often referred to as 
the social partners) was motivated in large part by mistrust of the state
174
 
and justified by the fact that employees and employers fund the system 
and thus have an interest in it.
175
 
In fact, however, the government has long played an important 
policymaking role in the French first tier mandatory health insurance 
system.
176
  For example, the government sets the health insurance 
premium levels
177
 and establishes the statutory rates that health care 
 
 172.  Steffen, supra note 4, at 355.  
 173.  PALIER, supra note 67, at 81; Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 244; Sorum, supra 
note 5, at 232. When the health insurance system was originally created, there were more employee 
representatives than employer representatives in the governing boards of the health insurance funds.  
Now, there are an equal number of employee and employer representatives, and more importantly, 
there are four representatives appointed by the government as well as one or two representatives of 
mutual and family associations. Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 256. 
 174.  PALIER, supra note 67, at 84. (stating that the French mistrusted the state because of its 
lack of flexibility and adaptability and its bureaucratic structure).   
 175.  Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 244. 
 176.  According to Simone Sandier, Valérie Paris, and Dominique Polton, 
Traditionally . . .  the state handled policy concerning public hospital and drugs, while the health 
insurance funds took charge of independent (private) medical practice (including the services 
provided by self-employed professionals and private for-profit hospitals) on the basis of negotiated 
agreements. Decisions concerning the financing of health insurance funds (conditions and levels of 
social contributions) were clearly within the state’s remit.  
SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 140; see also PALIER, supra note 67, at 142-48 (describing the 
three-party (tripartisme) governance of the social security system under which governance is shared 
by employer organizations, trade unions representing employees, and the government); Pellet, supra 
note 69, at 108 (stating that since the social security system was created in 1945, the state has had 
the responsibility for financial stability of the health care system; the social partners have only had 
responsibility for the managing the administrative budget of the health care funds). 
 177.  See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 137 (“[T]”he French health insurance funds have 
never really had the management responsibilities accorded to sickness funds in the German health 
care system.  The state rapidly took responsibility for the financial and operational management of 
health insurance (for example, setting premium levels and the price of goods and services, etc.).”); 
see also Steffen, supra note 4, at 360 (“Health insurance thus started without institutional autonomy 
and no control over the amounts of contributions, rates of reimbursement, and the rates applied by 
doctors.”).   
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providers may charge for their services.
178
  The government also 
oversees national negotiations between the principle mandatory health 
insurance regimes and health care providers in order to ensure that all 
providers are subject to uniform reimbursement policies.
179
  Moreover, 
since 1996, the total social security budget has been set in advance each 
year by parliamentary vote, and the Parliament votes for the target rate 
of growth for ambulatory care expenses and total health care 
expenditures.
180
 
The division of power between the government and the health 
insurance funds has long been problematic,
181
 and as funding of the 
system has shifted from pure wage-based social contributions to more 
general tax-based financing, the social partners’ justification for 
controlling the system has weakened while the state’s right to control the 
system has increased.
182
  Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, the social 
partners have objected to the shift away from wage-based financing and 
the concomitant dilution of their power to regulate the health care 
funds.
183
 
In sum, employers play a role in managing the first tier health 
insurance funds.
184
  Their powers, however, are circumscribed,
185
 and 
 
 178.  See Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 97. 
 179.  Victor G. Rodwin & Simone Sandier, Health Care Under French National Health 
Insurance: A Public-Private Mix, Low Prices and High Volumes, in UNIVERSAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE IN FRANCE: HOW SUSTAINABLE? 169, 175 (2006). Different reimbursement rates apply 
to the Alsace-Moselle region’s local scheme as well as certain public sector schemes.  Bellanger et. 
al., supra note 20, at S24.  
 180.  Lise Rochaix & David Wilsford, State Autonomy, Policy Paralysis: Paradoxes of 
Institutions and Culture in the French Health Care System, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 97, 113 
(2005).  In practice, however, the targets are not mandatory and are regularly surpassed. Id. at 114; 
see also Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 85-87 (discussing the national ceiling for mandatory 
health insurance expenditures).   
 181.  See SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 141 (“[T] division of responsibilities remains 
unclear, and in recent years relations between state authorities and the health insurance funds have 
been marked by periods of open conflict, with the trend towards increased state control regularly 
denounced by the health insurance funds.”). 
 182.  See Reclaiming Welfare, supra note 156, at 253; Entre Bismarck et Beveridge, supra note 
165, at 327.  
 183.  See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 71, at 202 (“Employers and labor leaders alike understood 
that if health insurance premiums were ‘fiscalized,’ that is, transferred to a generalized income tax, 
their claims to control Sécurité Sociale governing boards would surely diminish.  This was a 
prospect to which they were determinedly opposed.”); PALIER, supra note 67, at 78 (discussing 
trade union and employer objections). 
 184.  See DUTTON, supra note 71, at 218-19 (“French union leaders and employers still exert 
an influence over Sécurité Sociale that is out of all proportion to what should be a democratically 
accountable institution of universal health coverage.”). 
 185.  See Rochaix & Wilsford, supra note 180, at 101. (“[National Health Insurance] funds are 
considered quasi-public agencies, as opposed to integrated organs of the state . . . . In truth, all the 
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according to some authorities, employers play a minor role in creating 
policy.
186
 
C. Provision of Voluntary Health Insurance 
About half of voluntary private health insurance contracts are 
purchased through the group insurance market by employers providing 
job-related benefits,
187
 and more than seventy percent of employees are 
offered supplementary health insurance by their employer.
188
  On 
average, employers pay about sixty percent of the cost of premiums for 
voluntary health insurance.
189
  Employees can exclude the cost of 
premiums paid by their employer from their income; although, there is 
no tax advantage for the employee’s share of the premium or for the cost 
of insurance purchased through the individual market.
190
  Effective 
January 1, 2016, employers will be required to provide complementary 
health insurance.
191
 
 
laws governing sickness fund operations reserve ultimate authority to the French state, which 
increasingly intervenes in the sickness funds’ decision making); Ph. R. Mossé, Towards A 
Professional Rationalization: Lessons from the French Health Care System, 53 AM. J. ECO. & SOC. 
129, 130 (1994) (“From an institutional point of view, the [National Social Security System] is an 
independent and non profit organization managed by representatives of the employers and the labor 
unions.  Currently, however the State plays a great part in its regulation.”). 
 186.  See Rochaix & Wilsford, supra note 180, at 101-02; Indeed, the Caisse Nationale de 
l’Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salarié published a strategic plan proposing a number of 
reforms. IMAI ET AL., supra note 9, at 124. Most of the reforms, however, required governmental 
approval and legislation to implement.  Id. at 125; Steffen, supra note 4, at 372-73 (“The funds’ 
former governing boards have been reduced to advisory organs and enlarged to include members 
other than the social partners.  It is now the director general who leads negotiations with the medical 
unions on a program of objectives that the government board can only discuss.  The central aspect 
of the Bismarckian institution (i.e., self-government) has thus been eliminated.”). 
 187.  See supra Part 2.B.1. 
 188.  Francesconi et al., supra note 113, at 1.   
 189.  Chevreul et al., supra note 10, at 75.   
 190.  See id. at 72 (“[F]iscal rebates are offered to employers that buy and offer group contracts 
to their employees, while employees can [deduct] the cost of premiums from their taxable 
income.”); Grignon & Kambia-Chopin, supra note 101, at 8 (“In France contributions paid for 
directly by employers to a [complementary health insurance] contract are not taxed (even though 
they could be considered in-kind wages) but there is no tax credit for individuals purchasing 
[complementary health insurance] on the non-group market or on the employee’s share of the 
contribution in the group market.”); Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 14, n.13 (“When 
enrollment by employees is obligatory (which is true for roughly half of all employer-sponsored 
health contracts) health insurance is considered a tax-deductible expense for employers and a tax-
free benefit to employees.  Additional payroll contribution rebates apply for the employers’ 
contribution to health insurance regardless of the mandatory characteristic.  Tax deductions also 
exist for the self-employed.”).   
 191.  Labor Law Reform Act, supra note 11.  
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IV. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM 
Like in France, the employer plays an important role in the U.S. 
health insurance system.  First, the employer plays an important role in 
funding the U.S. mandatory health insurance system, Medicare.
192
  In 
addition, the employer plays a critical role in providing voluntary health 
insurance.
193
  Unlike in France, however, the employer plays no role in 
administering Medicare, the mandatory health insurance program.
194
 
A. Funding of Mandatory Health Insurance 
Like France, the United States has a mandatory health insurance 
program: Medicare, which is part of its Social Security system.
195
  
Unlike in France, however, the U.S. mandatory health insurance 
program does not extend coverage to the entire U.S. population.  Instead, 
coverage is limited to the elderly and disabled.
196
  While Medicare 
covers almost the entire 65 and over population,
197
 it covers less than 
18% of the nonelderly U.S. population.
198
 
Medicare
199
 has two components: mandatory Hospital Insurance 
(HI), otherwise known as Medicare Part A, and voluntary 
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI), which consists of Medicare 
Part B and Part D.
200
  Medicare Part A helps to pay for the cost of 
hospital, home health, skilled nursing, and hospice care for the elderly 
and disabled.
201
  Medicare Part B helps to pay for the cost of physician, 
outpatient hospital, home health and other care for individuals who 
voluntarily enroll in the program.
202
  Medicare Part D helps covers the 
 
 192.  Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 9 (2012). 
 193.  See GLIED, supra note 2, at 37. 
 194.  See Kaplan, supra note 192, at 9.  
 195.  Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq (2006). 
 196.  THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. AND FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, 
2012 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT] (“In 2011, 
Medicare covered 48.7 million people: 40.4 million aged 65 and older, and 8.3 million disabled.”). 
 197.  See PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 376, SOURCES OF 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2012 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2012_No376_Sources1.pdf. 
 198.  Id. at 5. 
 199.  See generally Kaplan, supra note 192 (providing an overview of Medicare).  
 200.  2012 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 196, at 1. Medicare Part C provides a 
voluntary alternative to Part A and Part B coverage. Id.   
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
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cost of drugs for covered individuals.
203
 
About 85% of the funding of Medicare Part A comes from payroll 
taxes,
204
 with employers and employees each paying a payroll tax equal 
to 1.45% of total wages.
205
  Thus, about 42% of funding for Medicare’s 
mandatory Part A program comes from employers.
206
  Beginning in 
2013, the employer share will fall a bit as high-income workers will be 
required to pay an additional 0.9% tax on their earnings above an 
unindexed threshold of $200,000 for single taxpayers and $250,000 for 
married couples.
207
 
B. Voluntary Health Insurance 
In the United States, about 60% of the population under the age of 
65 is covered by employment-based health insurance.
208
  On average, 
employers contribute 82% of the premiums for single coverage and 72% 
of the premiums for family coverage.
209
  As in France, employees can 
exclude the cost of premiums paid by their employer from their 
income.
210
  In addition, unlike in France, employees can receive 
favorable tax treatment with respect to their share of health care 
premiums if their employer offers a cafeteria plan.
211
 
Historically, the provision of employment-based health insurance 
was purely voluntary.
212
  With the enactment of the Patient Protection 
 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See id. at tbl.II.B1. 
 205.  26 U.S.C. § 3111(b)(6) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(6) (2006). Prior to 1994, Medicare, 
like Social Security was subject to a wage cap, referred to as the taxabale wage base.  Cf. Social 
Security Reform, supra note 69, at 369 (discussing maximum taxable wage base under U.S. Social 
Security system). Effective in 1994, the taxable wage base applicable to Medicare was eliminated so 
that the Medicare tax now applies to all wages. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, § 13207, 107 Stat. 467 (1993) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006)).  
 206.  Financing for voluntary parts B and D, in contrast comes from a combination of enrollee 
premiums and general tax revenues. 2012 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 196, at 10 
tbl.II.B1. 
 207.  Id. at 10.  
 208.  FRONSTIN, supra note 197, at 5 fig. 1 (showing that in 2011, 58.4% of the nonelderly 
population was covered by employment-based health insurance coverage). 
 209.  See GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. 
TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 72 (2012 
 210.  See 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 211.  See 26 U.S.C. § 125 (2006).  See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. 
MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 131-33 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing 
cafeteria plans and their effect on the taxability of employee contributions to fund employer-
sponsored health care plans). 
 212.  See generally Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance 
After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 887-92 (2011) 
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and Affordable Care Act,
213
 large employers that fail to offer health 
insurance will be subject to an excise tax beginning in 2014.
214
 In 
addition, beginning in 2018, an excise tax will be imposed on 
employment-based health insurance that is too generous.
215
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On the surface, the French health care system appears very different 
from the U.S. system.  Specifically, the French health care system has 
first tier mandatory health insurance that covers the entire population
216
 
while the only mandatory health insurance system in the United States, 
Medicare, generally only covers the 65 and older population.
217
  
Moreover, French employers play a role in managing the first tier health 
insurance system
218
 while U.S. employers play no role in the 
management of Medicare.
219
 
Upon closer examination, however, the French and U.S. health care 
systems are quite similar in that employers play an important role in both 
countries’ health care systems.  First, in both France and the United 
States, employers’ wage-based contributions finance about half the costs 
of mandatory health insurance.
220
  Second, employment-based voluntary 
health insurance is quite prevalent in both countries.
221
 
Although the two countries are similar in that employers play an 
important role in their health care systems, that is not necessarily an 
advantage.  Indeed, the employment-based nature of health insurance in 
 
[hereinafter Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance] (discussing the history of the 
development of employment-based health insurance in the United States). 
 213.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 129 (2010); 
see id. at 903 (discussing the likelihood that the Affordable Care Act will affect employers’ 
willingness to offer health insurance).  
 214.  See Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 903. On July 2, 
2013, the Obama Administration announced  that it would delay until 2015 enforcement of the 
excise tax on large employers who fail to offer health care coverage.  Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, 
Crucial Mandate Delayed a Year for Health Law, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2013 at A1.  
 215.  26 U.S.C. § 4980I (Supp. 2011). 
 216.  Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 8; see also supra notes 13-15 and 
accompanying text. 
 217.  See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.  
 218.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 219.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text.  
 220.  See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 221.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see generally Future of Employment-Based 
Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 892-902 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
employment-based health insurance in the United States). 
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both countries has been subject to significant criticism.
222
 
First, critics contend that employment-based financing of health 
care reduces employers’ competitiveness and thus hinders employment 
and economic growth.
223
  Indeed, the French government shifted from 
the employee waged-based social contribution to the broader income-
based CSG to fund mandatory health insurance in large part because of 
concerns regarding unemployment and employers’ competitiveness.224 
Second, critics of employment-based health insurance contend that 
employment-based health care contributes to the high cost of health 
care.
225
  In 2010, health care costs in the United States constituted 17.6% 
of GDP, the highest in the developed world.
226
  In France, health care 
costs constituted 11.6% of GDP,
227
 two percentage points higher than 
the OECD average of 9.5%,
228
 and third highest in the world.
229
 
Critics of the employment-based health care system in the United 
State object to its high administrative costs relative to a universal single-
payer system
230
 and contend that its favorable tax treatment creates an 
incentive to overinsure and thus leads to increased health care costs.
231
  
Effective in 2018, the Affordable Care Act will introduce an excise tax 
on high-cost employment-based health insurance plans aimed at 
reducing the incentive to overinsure.
232
  Whether the excise tax will be 
 
 222.  See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 71, at 218 (“[T]he single most imperative reform to U.S. 
and French health care is to sever the obsolete link between employment and health security.”). 
 223.  See id. at 219 (“Only if the link between health care financing and security from the 
calculations of workers and employers is severed will health care cease to hinder employment and 
economic growth.”); Gentile, supra note 55, at 145-47 (describing and refuting argument).  
 224.  See Bonoli & Palier, supra note 156, at 252 (explaining that French government’s push to 
transform mandatory health insurance system from employment-based system to universal, state-
managed and tax-financed one was driven in large part by “the desire to reduce contributions and , 
as a result, the cost of labour”). 
 225.  See, e.g., Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 893-94. 
 226.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2012: HOW DOES THE 
UNITED STATES COMPARE 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/BriefingNoteUSA2012.pdf.  
 227.  Id.  
 228.  See id. Health care spending as a share of GDP was much lower in France than in the 
United States, which was 17.6% in 2010. Id. In addition, it was slightly than in the Netherlands 
(twelve percent) and the same as in Germany. Id.   
 229.   The only countries in which health care costs represent a higher percentage of GDP are 
the United States and the Netherlands.  Id.  Like France, health care spending in Germany 
constitutes 11.6% of GDP.  Id.  Interestingly, among OECD countries, the four countries in which 
health care spending represented the highest percentage of GDP are also the four countries in which 
private health insurance represented the highest percent of health expenditure in 2000.  See 
Columbo & Tapay, supra note 101, at 9 fig.1.  
 230.  See Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 212, at 893-94.  
 231.  See id.  
 232.  Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65 TAX L. REV. 749, 
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effective in reducing costs remains to be seen.
233
 
Critics of the French health care system contend that 
complementary health insurance (which is offered and funded in large 
part by employers) has made it difficult to contain health care costs.
234
  
When the French government instituted its mandatory health insurance 
system, it required that individuals pay a portion of the cost of their care 
(ticket modérateurs).
235
  The co-payments were intended to moderate 
demand. 
236
  Because complementary health insurance typically covers 
these co-payments,
237
 it eliminates their ability to reduce moral hazard so 
as to rein in costs.
238
 
The moral hazard created by complementary insurance may be 
somewhat tempered by the additional flat co-payments that were 
introduced in 2005 because the new flat co-payments may not be 
reimbursed by complementary health insurance.
239
  They are unlikely, 
however, to have a substantial impact on utilization given their relatively 
modest size - €1 for every doctor visit and test up to €4 per day and €2 
for each medical transport by ambulance or medical taxi and €0.50 for 
each drug up to a second €50 ceiling. 
A third criticism leveled against employment-based health care is 
that it creates inequality in access to care.  Lack of health insurance 
coverage has been a serious problem in the United States.  For example, 
in 2011, 18% of the nonelderly population had no health insurance.
240
  
The Affordable Care was enacted, in part, to address the lack of health 
care coverage.
241
  It did not, however, eliminate employment-based 
health care, and how effective it will be in extending health care 
coverage to the entire U.S. population remains to be seen. 
Although the first tier mandatory health insurance system covers 
the entire French population, prior to the introduction of CMU-C, the 
poor and unemployed were less likely to have complementary health 
insurance and thus face out-of-pocket expenses when using health 
 
749 (2012). 
 233.  See generally id. (criticizing the new excise tax).  
 234.  See, e.g., Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, at 15-17.; Gentile, supra note 55, at 
132; SANDIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 146.  
 235.  See Gentile, supra note 55, at 132. 
 236.   See supra Part 2.A.5. 
 237.   See supra Part 2.B.3. 
 238.   See generally Mark V. Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 531 (1968) (discussing moral hazard and the use of the deductible and co-payment to 
reduce moral hazard).  
 239.   See supra Part 2.A.5. 
 240.  FRONSTIN, supra note 197, at 4.  
 241.  See FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 211, at 94-95.  
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care.
242
  Studies showed that that those who did not have complementary 
health insurance did not consult doctors and dentists as frequently as 
those who were covered by complementary health insurance nor were 
they as likely to spend as much on pharmaceuticals.
243
  Critics of the 
French health care system contended that complementary coverage 
created inequality of access to health care.
244
  The French government 
addressed this concern by extending CMU-C to the non-elderly poor.
245
 
Although the French health care system has been ranked the best in 
the world, the fact that employers play an important role in the system 
does not appear to be a strength of the system.  Instead, it may be the 
greatest weakness in the system and exacerbate one of the most pressing 
issues facing health care systems throughout the developed world, 
escalating costs. 
 
 
 242.  Grignon et al., supra note 102, at 205.   
 243.  Thomson & Mossialos, supra note 89, at 435; Buchmueller & Couffinhal, supra note 15, 
at 15-16 & n.15 DUTTON, supra note 71, at 203 n.65.  
 244.  Id. at 203 (“Albeit less pronounced, France’s comparable historical tradition of 
workplace health coverage underlies inequities of health care access because of the continued 
importance of supplemental insurance.”); Gentile, supra note 55, at 155 (“The disparity in 
complementary coverage became one of the principle sources of inequality in the French health 
system.”). 
 245. According to one study, it appears that CMU-C has increased utilization by newly 
covered individuals.  Grignon et al., supra note 102 at 217 (noting that individuals who enrolled in 
the free plan had a significantly higher probability of using health care services and that this effect is 
likely driven by those with no supplemental coverage prior to enrollment).  Of course, extending 
complementary coverage increases the likelihood that lower-income individuals will use health care 
and thus increases costs.  By extending complementary coverage, the French government has 
chosen to enhance equity in coverage at the expense of efficiency. Buchmueller & Couffinhal, 
supra note 15, at 19.  
